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When Blood Won’t Tell:
Integrated Transfusions and
Shifting Foundations of Race
Susie Woo
On May 29, 1956, nurses climbed aboard USS Lake Champlain to col-
lect a thousand pints of crew member blood. A US military photographer was 
on hand to document the event, not because blood drives were rare but rather 
to spotlight a marked change. In the single shot selected for print, the photog-
rapher captured the moment of exchange between a white nurse and the only 
African American navy man in line [Figure 1]. The image was part of a series of 
military photographs taken during the 1950s intended to chronicle an integrated 
army. However, despite the photographer’s objective to offer visual evidence of 
purportedly seamless racial integration, the image could not contain the awk-
wardness of that blood drive. To keep her bodily distance, the nurse fully ex-
tends her arm to give the African American man the vial; her white hands nearly 
but, importantly, do not touch his black hands—both visible strains that more 
accurately represent the stutter steps of desegregation. Perhaps most revealing 
is the unhappy expression of the seaman instructed to hold his pose and the 
firm gaze of the second nurse who peers through her glasses to stare at the man 
whose blood will only be marked by type, not by race.
The American Red Cross (ARC) integrated the national blood supply in 
1950. For the first time on a large scale, blood moved indiscriminately between 
differently raced bodies. By the end of the Korean War in 1953, tens of thou-
sands of US servicemen returned home with racially anonymous transfused 
blood coursing through their veins. And given the continual need for blood 
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in hospitals across the nation, researchers estimated that the integrated supply 
would reach millions more in the decades to come.1 Despite efforts to show oth-
erwise, the photograph shown in Figure 1 could not contain the significance of 
mixing the national blood supply, of allowing black blood to travel freely into 
white bodies. The tension in the photograph signaled the challenge of narrat-
ing transfusions after 1950. Once the ARC desegregated blood, conversations 
about transfusions required careful management, for blood carried with it deep-
rooted associations as well as the legal power to determine who had access to 
citizenship, property, and marriage.
This essay considers what happened to blood at this moment of change. It 
traces how blood—so central to conversations about race for decades—receded 
into the background by the 1950s. Beginning with civil rights protests against 
the ARC’s blood-segregating policies during World War II and ending with the 
National Blood Program’s (NBP’s) rescripting of blood during the Korean War 
(1950–1953), the essay explores how Cold War and civil rights pressures con-
verged to reconfigure blood as a less potent symbol of race. After the ARC 
desegregated blood, the NBP’s publicity council, organizations like UNESCO, 
and mainstream media actively ushered conversations about race away from 
blood. Together, they narrated transfusions in ways that changed popular as-
Figure 1: Official photograph, US Navy, USS Lake Champlain, May 29, 1956, 
CVA-39-4595, Military Photographic Collection, Schomburg Center for Research 
in Black Culture, New York Public Library.
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sumptions about blood, downplayed the significance of its mixture, and helped 
drive race-identifying practices away from the body altogether.
After its integration, blood would never be quite the same. Blood symbol-
ized too much yet not enough all at once. The malleable, nonvisible, and ma-
nipulatable fluid had served those interested in upholding white power well in 
their efforts to designate blackness in the court of law, yet after its integration, 
they abandoned it albeit begrudgingly. While some doctors, blood collection 
agencies, and hospitals primarily in the South refused to follow the ARC’s in-
tegration policy, most were forced to give up on blood as a way to categorize 
race. For in its new irreversibly mixed form, blood could no longer uphold the 
fiction of white purity. As the body became an increasingly unstable location 
for race identification, Americans would witness—and some would take part 
in—utilizing culture instead of blood to differentiate white from other. The shift 
in focus from blood to culture revealed the fluidity of race and the disturbing 
adaptability of the categories used to uphold white power.
Blood, Race, and the ARC’s Labeling Scandal
In the United States, blood played a critical if unstable role in categorizing 
the supposed difference between white and black. In the 1800s, slavery pro-
ponents justified the practice by stigmatizing black blood as a contaminant. In 
1851, physician Samuel Cartwright described a disease “peculiar to negroes” 
whereby a lack of “red, vital blood . . . chain[ed] the mind to ignorance and 
barbarism, when in freedom.”2 In his proslavery deduction, the only cure for the 
disease he named “dysaesthesia aethiopica” was to place black men and women 
under the supervision of white men and force them into physical labor, actions 
that would purportedly help “red, vital blood” reach the brain. Cartwright’s 
Confederate contemporaries agreed that “negro ineptitude” was a symptom of 
blood and nerve disease.3
Blood took on even greater significance after emancipation when, as de-
scribed by Eva Saks, black skin ceased to signify slave status.4 Saks astutely 
demonstrates how, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, blood became a potent 
symbol used to argue that race was not what appeared on the outside but rather 
was constituted within the body. For those vested in white power, race turned 
inward, and blood came to designate race by collapsing ideas of heredity, kin, 
and community—a binding fictive relationship that grew dangerously natural-
ized over time.5
During the first half of the twentieth century, pseudoscientific logic that 
linked blood to race carried far-reaching social and legal effects. In the court of 
law, blood became a designator of race used to classify individuals as nonwhite, 
racial evidence that was then used to deny those individuals the right to natural-
ize or own property.6 Antimiscegenation laws repeatedly turned to a combina-
tion of appearance and blood pedigree to deny interracial marriage, primarily 
between white and black couples but also between white and Asian, Mexican, 
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or Native American couples.7 Peggy Pascoe shows that plaintiffs, defendants, 
lawyers, and judges manipulated blood to prevent and dissolve interracial mar-
riages until 1967 when the Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that the 
practice was unconstitutional. Pascoe convincingly argues that using blood for 
these purposes was more than just another form of segregation; it was the very 
foundation of white supremacy that relied on the fiction of white purity to sus-
tain power.8
Even though eugenic theory was on the wane by the 1940s and scientific 
studies refuted the correlation between blood and race, decades of social train-
ing made it difficult for many to shake the idea that blood and race were synon-
ymous. Nowhere was this more evident than in discussions about blood transfu-
sions. As transfusion technology improved in the 1940s and the practice grew 
more common, some wondered if transfused black blood would racially alter 
white patients. If the effects did not manifest immediately, then perhaps they 
would down the road when grandchildren and great-grandchildren would be 
born with “Negro” characteristics.9 In 1942, Mississippi Senator John Rankin 
declared that if blood transfusions were integrated, race and especially white-
ness would become “mongrelized.”10 Concerns like these reflected both the 
newness of blood transfusions and the core fear of white segregationists. For if 
race failed to remain distinct at the level of blood, how could one identify the 
difference on which white power relied? If white blood were indiscriminately 
mixed with black blood, would there be any value left to whiteness?
The historic use of blood as a naturalized location of race complicated 
transfusion protocol starting with the first national blood drive during World 
War II. In November 1941, the ARC officially announced that it would exclude 
African American donors. Two months later, following significant criticism, 
the organization altered its policy to accept African American blood but only 
if it remained segregated.11 As Thomas Guglielmo has demonstrated, the ARC 
based its decision to separate black blood on the wishes of a general (white) 
public who would supposedly not stand for blood integration.12 Administrators 
explained that because of the state of race relations and the novelty of transfu-
sions, accepting white and black blood together proved politically untenable. 
The ARC further reasoned that since the US Army was segregated, it would be 
best for the morale of white soldiers if the ARC did not collect African Ameri-
can blood.13 The ARC’s stance was hardly unique during a time of Jim Crow. 
Cities often set up separate ambulance companies, one for white and one for 
black patients; some hospitals denied service to African Americans outright; 
and, despite the ARC’s policy to label and segregate blood, many blood dona-
tion centers did not accept “Negro blood” at all.14
Several well-respected organizations publicly refuted the ARC’s policies. 
In 1941, the National Medical Association criticized the unscientific premise of 
blood segregation and argued that blood types, not race, determined successful 
transfusions.15 A year later, the American Association of Physical Anthropolo-
gists (AAPA) released a statement that “prejudice against Negro blood” was all 
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the more difficult to understand because “many a Southerner was nursed at the 
breast of a Negro mammy.” The committee continued that it made no sense that 
Americans opposed African American blood but not that of horses and rabbits 
whose blood serum was used to cure human cases of diphtheria and pneumo-
nia.16 The AAPA’s statement brought into clear focus the contradictions of the 
ARC’s segregation policy. By offering up examples of intimately exchanged 
fluids between whites, blacks, and even nonhuman species, the AAPA set out to 
prove the absurdity of segregating black blood.
During the war, hundreds wrote the ARC, President Franklin Roosevelt, 
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, and the surgeons general of the army and navy 
to criticize the antidemocratic policy.17 They protested in more public ways as 
well. In 1942, the March on Washington movement gathered 20,000 people in 
New York City to condemn the Jim Crow policies of the ARC and the military.18 
Seeing how integral the blood transfusion debate was to African American 
claims to citizenship, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) used the ongoing war as a backdrop to show how blood seg-
regation undermined the goal of equality and threatened to mirror the evils of 
Nazi ideology.
In response to the sharp criticism, the ARC publicly abandoned its blood-
labeling policy in 1943.19 However, privately and just a year later, it imple-
mented the Dedication Label Plan, instructing workers to once again label black 
blood but this time to do so “inobtrusively [sic], preferably after the donor 
ha[d] gone.”20 Black blood was to be labeled with “AA” for “Afro-American,” 
while nonblack blood, including that of other people of color, was to remain 
unmarked.21 Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, wrote the chair-
man of the ARC demanding that it made no sense for the ARC and the military 
to mix Asian blood with white blood while requiring the separation of black 
blood.22 Publicly, little controversy surrounded the intermixture of Asian, La-
tino, and Native American blood with white patients.23 However, donor center 
confusion about the labeling protocol for other nonwhite donors reflected the 
arbitrariness of labeling only African American blood.
The reasons for singling out black blood varied. To begin, the sheer need 
for blood during World War II far exceeded the number of donors, which made 
it logistically challenging for the ARC to separate all nonwhite blood according 
to race.24 Since the total population of those who were neither black nor white 
in the United States remained relatively small, the donor pool for other racial 
minorities was not significant, making specific policies surrounding their blood 
impractical.25 Racial hierarchies also played a role. Ambiguity surrounding the 
labeling practices of Asian, Latino, and Native American donors clarified that 
it was not necessarily the nonwhiteness of blood that mattered as much as its 
blackness, the latter the only group that collection agencies were consistently 
instructed to label and keep separate. The long history of blood and race in the 
United States shaped the stigma against black blood in particular.
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As described earlier, white supremacists defined black bodies as a threat 
to whiteness and argued that a single drop of black blood was enough to con-
taminate white purity.26 Nonblack racial minorities figured differently in US 
racial logic and according to eugenic theories did not espouse the same viril-
ity as African Americans. For example, orientalist histories of US paternalism 
and empire made Asian Americans seem docile in comparison, characteristics 
superimposed on biological imaginings of effete Asian bodies.27 The racially 
constructed weakness of nonblack minorities made their blood less potent and 
therefore admissible, even if not ideal, as donors to white recipients. It is impor-
tant to remember that like antimiscegenation laws that prevented whites from 
marrying nonwhites but allowed nonwhites to intermarry freely, blood transfu-
sions between African Americans and other nonwhite groups were permissible. 
Daniel Inouye writes in his autobiography that he received black blood when 
injured during World War II. That a Japanese American who could potentially 
give blood to a white person could also be the recipient of black blood suggests 
that the primary goal of blood labeling was not necessarily to keep black blood 
out of the donor pool but rather to keep black blood from directly entering white 
bodies specifically.28
In 1945 when the war ended, the need for blood declined, but labeling 
practices continued unabated. While still very much a civil rights issue, escalat-
ing Cold War pressures muted public debates surrounding segregated transfu-
sions. The US government created the Federal Loyalty Program in 1947 and 
indicted individuals who espoused racial equality on the grounds that they toed 
the Communist Party line. In this context, open criticism of the ARC’s blood-
segregating policy served as evidence of one’s communist affiliations. In 1955, 
for example, the program indicted Dorothy Bailey, a US Employment Service 
worker, in part for openly criticizing the ARC’s blood-segregating practices. A 
Loyalty official maintained that “objection to blood segregation [was] a recog-
nized ‘party line’ technic [sic]” used to get African Americans to join the Com-
munist Party.29 During the early Cold War, red-baiting made fighting for blood 
desegregation a costly liability.
Open criticism against blood labeling also brought unwanted attention 
on the broader failures of integration in the United States, a racial reality that 
marred the nation’s claims to democracy. Rapid decolonization after World 
War II resulted in numerous “nonaligned” countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America—nonwhite populations that in the binary logic of the Cold War would 
either fall to communism or choose democracy. As the United States expanded 
its global reach, it found it increasingly difficult to hide domestic race problems 
from international audiences made especially vigilant about the dangers of rac-
ism and the inhumanity of colonialism by the recent world war. This was in 
large part because civil rights leaders connected their struggle for equality to 
the US government’s Cold War aims abroad. In a concerted effort to enact leg-
islative changes at home, activists appealed to international audiences by airing 
America’s race problems for all to see. By doing so, they effectively raised an 
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important question: If Americans were racially discriminatory at home, could 
they support equality and democracy abroad?30
Amidst these pressures, the UN criticism of the ARC further challenged 
US claims to democracy. In September 1950, three months into the Korean 
War, 4,000 UN employees wanted to contribute blood to the war effort but re-
fused to cooperate with any agency that required the racial identification of its 
donors. In response, the ARC asked the UN committee if, rather than outright 
identification, the ARC could keep specially coded card files containing the 
“examiner’s opinion of the racial background of the donor,” to which the UN 
responded that this was “even worse.”31 The ARC then offered to drop the racial 
question entirely as long as it could request the donor’s nationality, a proposal 
also rejected by the UN committee, which decided not to donate blood until the 
problem was resolved.
Mounting domestic and international criticism, coupled with the increasing 
need for blood in Korea, effectively forced the hand of the ARC. On November 
19, 1950, the organization finally abandoned its blood-segregating policy. One 
of the first things that the ARC did was to invite the United Nations to donate 
blood, an action that demonstrated the extent of international influence on the 
ARC’s decision to change its policies. Within a few days of the policy change, 
ARC administrators released a statement that referred to blood segregation as a 
“fruitless controversy that had been based on a misconception.”32 By downplay-
ing the racist roots of its recent policy and minimizing the tenacity with which 
it had guarded blood segregation, the ARC did its best to push the damaging 
practice into obscurity. After all, the ARC’s blood-labeling scandal was hardly a 
“fruitless controversy,” and the reasons for the practice were much greater than 
a simple “misconception.” The word choice here suggested that blood should 
never have been separated in the first place, which in turn made the integrated 
blood supply seem to be a forgone conclusion. By shrouding the policy change 
in narratives of subtlety, the ARC muted the recent segregation of blood and its 
current integrated state, a process aimed at making its racist protocol appear to 
be a distant relic not worthy of comment.
While the ARC tried to move quickly beyond the recent blood debate, 
UNESCO seized the opportunity to make the incident a valuable teaching mo-
ment. In the early 1950s, UNESCO published a book series called “The Race 
Question in Modern Science” to discredit the linkage between race, blood, bi-
ology, and culture. In 1952, American sociologist Diana Tead synthesized the 
series for a “common” audience in a short book titled What Is Race? Evidence 
from Scientists. She used “non-technical language” and colorful illustrations in 
a “necessarily over-simplified form—so as to make [the scientific facts] more 
easily intelligible to the layman.”33 The primary goal of the booklet was to teach 
the public that using scientific claims to justify the domination of one group 
over another was dangerous and even deadly. Using the recent Holocaust as an 
example, Tead reified that the Nazi myth of Aryan superiority was supported by 
a similar brand of “so-called science.”34
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In her section on blood, Tead dispelled phrases like “Blood will tell,” “That 
girl comes from a family of good blood,” and “I understand there is Jewish 
blood in his family” (emphasis in the original). Tead averred that the confusion 
about blood in relation to race and superiority was a “hangover from the days 
before scientists had discovered genes.”35 Tead then explicated the latest find-
ings about blood backed by modern science, not superstition. In a diagram de-
picting the universal properties of blood, three variously shaded human shapes 
with tints ranging from black to gray stood side by side [Figure 2]. Lines con-
nected the blood types to all of the differently shaded (or raced) individuals. 
The simplicity of the drawing did not convey the details of blood transfusions 
but rather drilled the point that “people of all races can be found in each blood 
group” and, judging from the identically large red hearts, the capacity for ac-
ceptance. Given the UN interest in the recent US blood-segregating scandal and 
that Tead was an American familiar with the debate, the diagram spoke directly 
to recent ARC policy changes.
While UNESCO spotlighted the scientific and social soundness of the new-
ly integrated blood supply, southern ARC branches stubbornly held on to segre-
gating practices, making it difficult for the ARC to fully lay the controversy to 
rest. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi refused 
to stop blood-labeling practices. In 1951, violent demonstrations broke out in 
Alabama as protesters railed against continued blood segregation. Several well-
Figure 2: Diana Tead, What is Race? Evidence from Scientists (Paris: UNES-
CO Department of Mass Communication, 1952), 49.
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known white members of the state ARC resigned in solidarity with the protes-
tors.36 The NAACP accused Alabama’s ARC units of “obviously extending the 
segregated pattern unnecessarily and without any democratic justification.”37 
Public criticism against donor centers and hospitals that continued to label 
blood after 1950 remained localized primarily in the South, but the Korean War 
highlighted the national implications of southern segregating practices.
The Korean War was America’s first hot war of the Cold War era, and for 
many it served as a litmus test to measure the behavior of the United States 
as a new superpower. Domestic and international audiences were critical of 
President Truman’s entry into Korea’s civil war. From the outset, it became an 
imperative of Truman’s administration to assuage accusations of US imperial-
ism. In a speech addressing the Korean War in 1951, Truman assured the public 
that the United States did “not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves” 
reiterating that “[w]e believe in freedom for all the nations of the Far East . . . 
[and] want to help them secure for themselves better health, more food, better 
clothes and homes, and the chance to live their own lives in peace.”38 Truman’s 
speech situated Korea squarely within a Cold War framework that positioned 
the United States as benevolent defenders of (as well as capitalist providers to) 
the free world. This was a hard case to make when Americans could not achieve 
that same freedom at home.
In 1951, an African American World War II veteran from South Bend, In-
diana, wrote,
“Looking at the blood-soaked ground of the battlefields, I 
can’t say that I remember being able to tell colored blood 
from white or vice versa. My blood is as good as that of any 
white man. . . . If Memphis’ Red Cross refuses Negro blood 
because it is Negro, they are a shame to the cause of human-
ity and democracy.”39
The veteran’s words carried extra weight in the context of the ongoing war 
in Korea and encapsulated the core significance of blood desegregation for civil 
rights proponents. It was not just a matter of equality; it was about “humanity 
and democracy.” The language used here spoke to America’s broader Cold War 
aims. By emphasizing the damage wrought by southern ARC holdouts on Af-
rican Americans, the veteran also pointed to the practice as a poor reflection on 
US democracy and the nation as a whole.
Public criticism of the ARC centers that continued to segregate pressured 
the organization to conduct its own investigation in 1951.40 The process was 
largely symbolic, as the ARC administered the study from start to finish even as 
it outright denied that segregation existed in any part of their program. Not sur-
prisingly, the investigation yielded few results, and southern blood banks con-
tinued to label black blood. In 1960, Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana passed 
legislation that required hospitals and physicians to inform recipients of the 
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race of blood donors.41 In 1962, the Alabama House of Representatives voted 
sixty-nine to seven to keep the state’s blood banks segregated. The overwhelm-
ing victory was due in large part to state representative and practicing chiro-
practor Ashby Camp’s argument that “negro blood was known to have a defect 
not prevalent in white blood.”42 The chiropractor’s vague assertion showed that 
it took very little “scientific” evidence to convince southerners of the need to 
keep white and black blood separate.
With casualties mounting in Korea, the US government feared that on-
going controversies and contradictions within the ARC would hinder the war 
effort. In response, the federal government swiftly moved in to take a more 
controlling role of blood collection.
After Integration: The National Blood Program
Narrates Transfusions
In 1951, a year into the Korean War, President Truman created the NBP by 
executive order. It was estimated that a US military meeting stiff resistance in 
Korea would need 500 pints of blood daily. Blood-collecting efforts could not 
fail, and the government stepped in to take charge of all aspects of the program 
to ensure that it would not. The NBP subsumed the ARC utilizing the latter’s 
well-established infrastructure of donor centers and mobile units across the na-
tion, but from here the NBP actively distanced itself from the ARC. The NBP 
explicitly stated that once the ARC or the cooperating independent blood bank 
collected the blood, it was given to the Department of Defense or the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration. “At this point,” the NBP explained, “the blood 
[became] government property and the Red Cross responsibility for the blood 
[ended].”43 In describing its process to the public, the NBP distanced itself from 
the controversy-riddled ARC. This literal break allowed the NBP to absolve 
itself from ongoing criticism of the ARC for continued blood-labeling practices 
in the South and also from having to address the integrated national blood sup-
ply in any substantive way.
As the first federal organization to operate with the integrated blood supply, 
the NBP navigated the change by actively avoiding it. In its advertising efforts, 
the NBP sidestepped the issue of integrated blood altogether. In the context of 
when the program operated—during the war in Korea and as the US govern-
ment waged a global Cold War campaign—it seems curious that the NBP did 
not address the change at all—that it did not seize the opportunity to tout the 
acceptance of all races in a broader effort to promote visions of US democracy. 
The absence pointed to the NBP’s efforts to bypass existing tensions surround-
ing race and blood. In an effort to garner the most donations possible, the pro-
gram set out to supplant conversations about blood’s segregation as well as its 
integration. Indeed, the extent to which the NBP elided the controversial topic 
of race was manifest in how it set out to repackage transfusions through narra-
tives of whiteness, gender and sexual normativity, Cold War duty, and techno-
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logical advancement—a process that together drew blood away from racialized 
bodies altogether.
The NBP created its own advertising council to carefully navigate conver-
sations about transfusions. In 1952, the council produced an in-depth manual 
that included scripted radio spots, posters, and press releases. In the sixty-five-
page manual, blood integration was mentioned only twice and both times in the 
instructions section—once to explain that it did not matter who the blood came 
from and another as a reminder that “members of all races [were] accepted.”44 
The passing mention of race was only for the edification of volunteers and 
employees who worked at the centers and would not appear in any part of the 
publicity materials intended for the general public.
That the topic of race went missing from the advertising segment that took 
up the bulk of the manual signaled the significance of this intimate site of race 
mixture. To allay fears of the wrong kind of mixture, NBP ads consistently pro-
moted a singular type of donor–patient relationship. All of those pictured in the 
NBP manual were white.45 Print ads typically showed white women “rolling up 
their sleeves” and white children or servicemen as the recipients. By whitening 
the transfusion process from start to finish, the images helped supplant lurking 
fears of race mixture. Whiteness made the bodies involved in the transfusion 
process unremarkable, normalizing the donor to the point of erasure.
On the one hand, the absence of nonwhite individuals in the NBP publicity 
manual maintained the status quo. ARC campaigns during World War II simi-
larly pictured only white donors and recipients. In the continued logic of the 
ARC that instituted blood-segregating policies during World War II based on 
the belief that Americans would not donate unless black blood was segregated, 
the NBP feared that Americans would stop donating because of its integration. 
The NBP advertising council carried forth ARC narratives of whiteness for sim-
ilar purposes: to appeal to white Americans who made up the majority of the 
donor pool by fully erasing the specter of race mixture.
For both the ARC and the NBP, picturing the bodies of donors and recipi-
ents was central to narrating a particular version of the transfusion process. In 
their ads, the body became a signifier of spatial and racial order..46 By reading 
the bodies presented in ARC and NBP ads back to the process that they narrate, 
several conditions emerge. First, Asian, black, Latino, and Native American 
blood do not exist. All nonwhite races are excised by visualizing only white 
donors, patients, and medics. Second, the very substance around which the ads 
revolved remains unseen. There are no needles used to extract or inject blood 
and no vials to contain it. Both the ARC and the NBP may have avoided the 
more visceral aspects of transfusions to allay the fears of potentially squeamish 
viewers, but in all likelihood picturing blood in its anonymous, bodiless state 
proved detrimental to its blood-collecting efforts. For all of its magical, life-
giving properties, the public still needed to see the bodies from which the blood 
came and that it would presumably enter to maintain scripts of whiteness or, 
rather, not to see scripts of racial integration, whether real or implied.
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In addition to keeping the bodies white, NBP publicity materials main-
tained normative constructions of gender and sexuality. Like the ARC, the 
NBP’s advertising council understood the intimacy of transfusions and saw 
clearly how the ejection and injection of blood carried sexualized meaning. 
World War II blood drives operated on the assumption that donated blood went 
directly to wounded American soldiers on the front. Accordingly, the ARC ap-
pealed primarily to women to support heteronormative scripts of exchange. 
Posters invited women to do their part in the war by giving blood or volunteer-
ing for the ARC. Nurses donning the signature red cape sprang into action to 
aid American men. Even the few ARC posters that featured male medics on 
the battlefield appealed to female donors. In the “Now Dedicate Your Blood to 
a Man Overseas!” World War II campaign, donors could personalize blood by 
signing their name on the bottle “in honor of a husband, a son, any relative or 
friend in the armed forces.”47
By the early 1950s, when the NBP generated its own publicity, gender car-
ried additional weight. The end of World War II ushered insecurities triggered 
by shifts in traditional gender roles. Men returning from war attempted to reas-
sert their role as breadwinners, while women who had found work in the war 
industry were cajoled back home to resume their place as wives and mothers.48 
Like World War II, the men fighting in Korea were the primary recipients of 
blood, and NBP ads again appealed to female donors. But unlike World War 
II ARC posters, the NBP focused primarily on civilians as donors rather than 
nurses. In one of the posters, a white, female nurse tends to a white, female 
donor [Figure 3]. The reclining donor at the center of this poster was the anti–
Rosie the Riveter. With her delicate, manicured hands and tidy kerchief, giving 
blood was the extent of her public contribution, after which point she could re-
turn to her primary duties back home, not the factory. Her clothing and jewelry 
marked her as middle class, further solidifying her place in normative domestic 
constructions of the 1950s. In this way, the NBP ad could be cataloged along-
side other 1950s images of women presenting their new refrigerators, baking 
pies, or ironing, visions that helped settle the crisis of masculinity by evoking 
traditional gender expectations. As donors, women could contribute to the war 
effort without ever leaving the domestic realm. Safely contained by domesticity 
even when pictured outside of the home and in the donation center, the NBP’s 
donor purged the potential diversity of blood donations with dominant scripts 
of gendered, middle-class respectability.
Furthermore, during the early Cold War when sexual orientation could sig-
nal communist affiliations, picturing the white, female donor assuaged fears of 
homosexuality.49 Imagining white women as the primary providers of blood 
for men fighting in Korea sustained heteronormative narratives by keeping the 
exchange of bodily fluids between women and men (though still without rais-
ing the specter of sexual contact itself). Thus, the image of a white woman 
giving blood further normalized transfusions by defusing concerns about same-
sex exchanges. Like whitening scripts of exchange, heteronormative narratives 
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removed potential concerns about 
the intimate process of moving blood 
from one body to another. Of course, 
after 1950, donations readily flowed 
from men to women, between men, 
between women, and across racial 
lines, yet ads consistently depicted 
the exchange from white women to 
presumed white servicemen.
Though racially integrated blood 
provoked anxieties about racial 
mongrelization, transfusions from 
women to men did not spark fears of 
transferred feminine characteristics. 
The patriotic wartime narrative of 
women dutifully saving their country 
trumped the risk of transposed femi-
ninity or tainted masculinity. Rather, 
giving blood was an extension of 
women’s assumed role as nurturer 
and healer. By giving to the men who 
defended their honor abroad, wom-
en took their place as domesticated 
caregivers on the home front, thus 
leaving existing gender qualities intact. With whiteness as the shared founda-
tion between donor and recipient and blood moving from women to men, NBP 
advertisements used naturalized constructions of the biological and social fam-
ily to obfuscate possible concerns regarding race, gender, or sexuality in the 
transfusion process.
Mainstream media supported the same scripts. In Life magazine’s “All 
Along the Front in Korea: Blood Is Flowing,” images of white soldiers in Ko-
rea appear alongside text explaining the great need for blood on the front lines. 
The 1951 article is immediately followed by a two-page personal interest story 
about Margaret Burnett. An average New York City housewife, Mrs. Burnett 
was busy “buying wallpaper in a midtown Manhattan shop” when she saw 
signs to the ARC blood donation center and walked down the street to do her 
duty. “The nurse gently slipped a needle into a vein in her left arm,” and just 
fifteen minutes later she filled a pint bottle. A week later, eighteen-year-old Pri-
vate Richard C. Cilley was wounded by a hand grenade and desperately needed 
blood. Field medics in Korea received a case that traveled “by plane, truck and 
helicopter. They took out a pint bottle and drained it into [Cilley’s] thirsty veins. 
. . . Margaret Burnett’s blood had reached its destination.”50 The photographs 
that accompanied the article dispelled any fears that either Mrs. Burnett or Pri-
vate Cilley was black. With normative race and gender constructs intact, blood 
Figure 3: National Blood Program 
Publicity Manual (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization, 
Executive Office of the President, 
1952), cover page.
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itself became secondary to the processes surrounding it. Instead, the technology 
that made it possible to transport blood “halfway around the world” and the 
patriotism of American women like Burnett took the spotlight.
Together, the NBP’s advertising council and mainstream media supplanted 
the integrated blood supply by normalizing transfusions as white to white and 
female to male. With this as the foundation, the NBP pushed forth more abstract 
appeals that moved blood well beyond the confines of raced, gendered, and 
sexualized bodies altogether. The NBP publicity manual opened with the words 
of George Washington: “Where is the man to be found who wishes to remain 
indebted for the defense of his own person and property to the exertion, the 
bravery, and the blood of others, without making generous effort to repay the 
debt of honor and gratitude.”51 The quote from a man who lived well before the 
advent of transfusions set the nationalist tone for the entire manual. It made do-
nating blood synonymous with Americanness. The words of one of America’s 
founding fathers and the nation’s first president made giving blood an inher-
ently American responsibility. Those who gave blood fulfilled their civic duty, 
while those who did not ultimately failed the nation. That blood wielded the 
power to mark a person’s patriotism helped to transfer associations about blood 
from the individual donor to the collective efforts of all Americans.
Throughout the manual, the NBP made it abundantly clear that donated 
blood belonged not to the individual but rather to the nation. The manual expli-
cated for the general public that once blood left the donor’s body, it was quite 
literally “government property.” The NBP detailed the process: “Contracts with 
plasma processing laboratories are between the government and the labora-
tories. Whole blood shipped overseas is Department of Defense property and 
is handled and administered by Armed Forces personnel.”52 Under the NBP’s 
watch, blood was militarized. The NBP separated it from donor bodies and im-
mediately committed the substance to the war effort. It placed donated blood 
squarely within the nation by putting it in the hands of the Department of De-
fense, the largest government agency that in 1947 consolidated the army, navy, 
and air force under the supervision of the secretary of state. In its radio scripts, 
the NBP directly connected blood in its bodiless state to national security at 
home and abroad. One script from the manual explicated that blood was stored 
outside of the body in sterile, government-owned containers that were then 
shipped to Korea for the war effort or stockpiled at home in preparation for a 
possible nuclear attack.53 While picturing vials of blood in posters was perhaps 
too closely associated to the body from which it came, verbally describing the 
pints in action for the nation appealed to donor patriotism.
While the primary goal of the NBP was to obtain blood for the Korean War, 
the war was not the leading rallying cry for its publicity campaign. Unlike the 
“Good War” of World War II, the Korean War was unpopular. By August 1950, 
a few months into the conflict, 49 percent of the American population thought 
that the war was misguided.54 By January 1, 1951, two-thirds of the American 
public wanted to remove US troops, and 50 percent believed that President Tru-
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man had made a mistake when he decided to enter the war.55 Pulitzer Prize–win-
ning World War II cartoonist Bill Mauldin remarked that the Korean War was an 
“unglorious” one where news of soldiers killed in action might only appear in 
hometown papers “on page 17 under a Lux [soap] ad.” Mauldin predicted that 
the Korean War veteran would come home not to a parade but rather quietly and 
alone, for “there’s no victory in the old-fashioned sense, anyway, because this 
[wasn’t] that kind of war. It [was] a slow, grinding, lonely, bitched-up war.”56
Most Americans felt distanced from Korea, literally and figuratively. The 
war took place over 6,000 miles away, and Americans knew relatively little 
about Korea or Koreans. These factors combined to make the threat of nuclear 
attack on American soil a more imminent concern for most Americans. Accord-
ingly, the NBP appealed to domestic Cold War fears and suggested the follow-
ing dramatizations for radio ads:
It is conservatively estimated that during the 3 weeks imme-
diately following an attack during which time only 15 atomic 
bombs were dropped the equivalent of at least 3 million pints 
of blood and plasma would be required. . . . Thus we see that 
3 million pints represent only a small part of the total civil de-
fense reserve that must be built up as quickly as possible. . . . 
If we are indifferent today, they will surely die if and when a 
black tomorrow of destruction dawns. In this age of total war, 
who can say: “I am safe” and convince himself he speaks the 
truth?57
What if war lashed out from behind the Iron Curtain to-
morrow? Or next week? Or next Christmas? What if this war 
is accompanied, as it very likely would be by atomic bombs 
bursting over our larger and more vital cities? What if ten 
of our cities were hit simultaneously? Well, if it happened 
tomorrow there would be far from enough blood plasma to 
go around.58
The NBP manual included illustrations of nuclear bomb attacks replete 
with mushroom plumes and parents cradling small children to add to the ur-
gency of the call. While most of the blood collected during the NBP’s existence 
from 1951 to 1953 was immediately sent to Korea, NBP appeals suggested that 
the blood would be stored at home in preparation for an imminent nuclear at-
tack. One radio script declared, “All Americans who realize the danger to our 
nation from possible enemy attack should go to their Red Cross chapter and ar-
range to give their donation of blood for Civil Defense.”59 The NBP navigated 
public opinion so as to garner the greatest amount of blood, and it accomplished 
this by teaching Americans to donate for national security. In these ways, the 
NBP emphasized how individual donations could support the larger whole of 
nation, superimposing the raceless (or assumed white) notion of patriotism and 
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civic duty over the underlying controversies surrounding the racially integrated 
blood supply.
When it did actually describe donors, the NBP made sure to bring the con-
versation back to the nation rather than to the donor’s body. For example, it em-
phasized that blood was a “miracle medicine” that only humans could produce, 
a fluid so rich with healing properties that the health of the nation depended on 
it.60 The manual asserts,
Blood is the magic gift of life. There is no substitute for it. It 
can only come from human donors. Remember that all weap-
ons of war, all medical supplies and equipment needed for 
civil defense in an emergency can be manufactured. All, that 
is, except one—BLOOD.61
The NBP advertising council billed blood as a human technology that 
worked toward civil defense rather than as a substance that carried with it prop-
erties of kin and ancestry. By likening blood to medical supplies and equipment, 
it became a technology of the body, a product that only humans could manu-
facture. The emphasis on the magical properties of blood and its central role in 
national security trumped the particularities of race, gender, and sexuality.
Another NBP tactic that further pulled blood literally and symbolically 
away from raced bodies centered on scientific language. To begin, the manual 
increased its use of the term “plasma.” Plasma was first popularized during 
World War II when the US government began researching how blood could 
improve medicine and society.62 As government-funded scientists discovered 
the useful properties of plasma, mainstream press taught audiences about the 
clear, yellowish, protein-rich fluid that, unlike whole blood, could be stored for 
long periods of time and be safely given without blood-typing.63 By the time 
the Korean War began and especially after blood integration in 1950, both the 
NBP and the ARC amplified their usage of the term. In 1951, the ARC named 
its national drive “Blood-for-Plasma” as opposed to simply calling it a “blood 
drive” as it had done in the past.64 Although whole blood was still used, in popu-
lar appeals blood became the means to retrieving plasma rather than being the 
means in and of itself. While blood had been linked to race for centuries, plasma 
had not been connected in any way to racial types, making plasma an ideal term 
when it came to evading the realities of integration.
During the 1950s, mainstream press also began to pay particular atten-
tion to the scientific advancements of blood transfusions, Cold War scripts that 
touted the technological prowess of the United States. In 1951, Edwin J. Cohn, 
a Harvard University physical chemist, invented a mechanical system to collect 
and process human blood. The machine was made of “stainless steel, glass and 
plastic . . . [containing] sets of centrifuges, filters and ionic exchange columns, 
controlled by switches, levers and pushbuttons.”65 Called the “fractionator” and 
nicknamed the “bedside factory,” doctors commended the device for its abil-
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ity to quickly separate blood components in a sealed system.66 As the machine 
extracted blood from the donor, the fluid ran through multiple chambers until 
it was mechanically transformed into elements that no longer even resembled 
blood. Detailed descriptions of separated, sterilized, and hermetically sealed 
plasma products that could be shipped and stored simultaneously disembodied 
and modernized blood.
In the end, the NBP escaped the perceived perils of intimate race mix-
ture through narratives of whitened, gendered, and heterosexualized exchanges 
made in patriotic service to national security. And by using science and tech-
nology to help change the very properties of blood, the NBP and mainstream 
media modernized the substance, giving it medical meaning completely de-
tached from its human origins. Given the reluctance of southern states to stop 
labeling practices, resistance that reflected deep-rooted beliefs that connected 
race to blood, the NBP’s efforts to avoid addressing the integrated supply may 
have contributed to their success. During the short-lived program from 1951 to 
1953, the NBP collected nearly 5 million pints of blood, an ample supply that 
saved ninety-eight out of every one hundred wounded soldiers transported to 
M.A.S.H. units during the Korean War.67
The NBP and mainstream media efforts to mitigate controversies surround-
ing the integration of the national blood supply by not directly naming race 
were symptomatic of continued assumptions about the threat of blackness. By 
erasing nonwhite race from the transfusion process altogether, the NBP stra-
tegically avoided the racial implications of blood integration. Indeed, it was 
the manual’s absences that revealed the significance of mixed transfusions on 
racial logic that relied on blood to delineate white from black and other. Blood 
had been used in social and legal realms to bolster the power of whiteness 
for decades, making its mixture highly problematic for some. While the NBP 
controlled mainstream conversations about blood during the Korean War, once 
the program ended in 1953, medical professionals and average citizens took 
up the conversation, and they grappled more directly with the significance of 
integrated transfusions on existing notions of race.
Toward Culture: Disembodying Blood and Race
Over the course of the recent blood debates and through the Korean War, 
the American public had come to know quite a bit about blood types, plasma, 
and the transfusion process.68 By the 1950s, Americans understood blood dif-
ferently. This is not to say that many did not try to sustain conversations that 
tied blood to race. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, researchers published find-
ings that pushed for a resegregation of blood. However, the studies met heavy 
resistance not only from medical professionals but also from the general public 
whose new knowledge of blood helped them dismantle the racist theories.
For example, when reports surfaced toward the end of the Korean War 
that donors transmitted communicable diseases to recipients, segregationists 
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jumped at the chance to argue that African Americans were more prone to dis-
eases, like sickle cell anemia and syphilis, that could be transfused to white pa-
tients.69 Susan Lederer describes how the biggest boon to such arguments came 
in 1959 when John Scudder, a doctor who once worked with Charles Drew, 
the African American doctor and coordinator of the first national blood drive 
in 1941, announced the potential perils of interracial transfusions.70 Scudder 
concluded that donors should be of the “same ethnic group as the patient’s” and 
“of the patient’s own race.”71 Aware of the controversy that his findings would 
bring, Scudder defended that it may have “sound[ed] wrong sociologically . . . 
but it [was] scientifically correct.”72
Within just three days of Scudder’s announcement, doctors and geneticists 
spoke out to discredit him. Philip Levine, the codiscoverer of the Rh factor, 
and prominent geneticists Theodosius Dobzhansky and Leslie C. Dunn, both of 
whom helped pen UNESCO’s revised Statement on Race in 1951, proclaimed 
that Scudder’s “so called ‘new philosophy’ serve[d] no useful purpose except 
to reinforce the old ‘philosophy’ of race prejudice.”73 By this point, the public 
was so well versed in the process of transfusions that the Columbia University 
doctors did not need to detail the faulty science behind Scudder’s false claims. 
Instead, they could aim directly at the racist foundations of his study that mis-
used science to sustain damaging myths.
To highlight the obvious fallacy of Scudder’s claims, African American 
physician and civil rights activist Edward Mazique reiterated that there was 
no such thing as a “pure” race or “pure” blood to begin with. Mazique directly 
challenged Scudder to “scientifically . . . identify his pure race before he [could] 
even begin the application of his new blood theory.” Mazique questioned the 
“contention that the American Negro [was] a distinct racial group, rather than 
a social concept or entity.”74 Recent discoveries about blood types and the long 
history of race intermixture dating back to slavery tied the blood bank debate to 
genetic race mixture. Mazique’s reference to white slave owners raping female 
slaves acted as a reminder that the black/white racial gene pool had already 
been mixed for over a century.75
The general public weighed in on the debate as well. In 1959, a Pittsburgh 
Courier journalist wrote that Scudder’s study caused “great jubilation among 
white racists . . . who believed they now had scientific confirmation for their 
insistence that ‘Negro’ blood should not be administered to whites, and vice 
versa.”76 The journalist did not hesitate to label Scudder’s supporters “white 
racists.” Against the backdrop of the recent blood-labeling controversy, the 
Courier could succinctly and unhesitatingly spotlight the fabricated science on 
which conversations about blood historically relied. Popular discussions about 
blood had shifted significantly. By the 1950s, tying blood to race evidenced 
nothing but racist beliefs that were incorrect and outdated.
The outpouring of resistance and critiques from a range of individuals that 
directly named racism as the foundation for Scudder’s findings made it clear 
that arguments linking blood to race could no longer be easily sustained. The 
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blood transfusion debates of the 1940s and 1950s made it common knowledge 
that blood did not carry racial characteristics, findings that had broad implica-
tions for the use of blood in other arenas as well. In the court of law, racial 
blood quantum had been used as evidence against interracial marriage since the 
early 1900s. After blood’s integration, cases could not easily ignore the inher-
ent problems of using blood to designate whiteness or blackness. For example, 
in Loving v. Virginia, the State of Virginia threatened to dissolve the marriage 
of Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving. The couple’s residency in Virginia went 
against the 1924 Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, which made it illegal for a 
white person to marry a colored person, the latter defined in 1910 as some-
one having one-sixteenth Negro blood and by 1930 as one with any ascertain-
able trace of Negro blood.77 The Lovings took their case to the Supreme Court, 
where presiding Chief Justice Earl Warren determined that attempts to “pre-
serve the racial integrity of its citizens” by preventing “the corruption of blood” 
and a “mongrel breed of citizens” were considered to be “relics of slavery” 
and “expressions of modern day racism.”78 The Court struck down Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation law on April 10, 1967, making it unconstitutional to deny 
marriage on the basis of race.
Commenting on the landmark Loving case, a Washington Post journalist 
asserted that there was a “nice element of absurdity” about the Virginia misce-
genation statute that defined a white person as one who has “no trace whatso-
ever of any blood other than Caucasian.” The Post argued that race purity was 
difficult to prove because there was “no way to determine race by blood. The 
blood of all humans [was] red—except when, for life-saving purposes, it [was] 
reduced to plasma” at which point it became “entirely colorless.”79 The logic 
and language used in the Post article demonstrated how pervasively lessons 
stemming from the blood integration controversy had permeated the conscious-
ness of average Americans. The comment was testament to how popular sci-
ence could drive a wedge between the deep-rooted coupling of race to blood.
Despite the NBP’s efforts to downplay the racial implications of integrated 
blood, it was not lost on the public what bodily locations of integration meant. 
To compound the significance of integrated transfusions, the post–World War 
II era witnessed an increase in discussions about other intimate sites of race 
mixture that further problematized the ability of the body to delineate race dif-
ference more broadly and sustain the fiction of white purity more specifically. 
In 1948, the Los Angeles Times reported that one in every three marriages in 
Hawai‘i were mixed. Andrew Lind, a widely respected University of Hawai‘i 
sociologist, asserted that it was “real democracy at work” and that the time was 
not far off not only when it would “be impossible to maintain racial distinctions, 
but [also] when it [would] be desirable to use a different basis for classifica-
tion.”80 In 1952, directly following her section on blood transfusions in What Is 
Race?, UNESCO’s Diana Tead remarked on rising genetic interraciality. Tead 
celebrated the tidal shift toward genetic race mixture already well under way 
in metropolitan centers. According to Tead, one need only sit in a “lively street 
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corner café of any cosmopolitan city” to witness a “good deal of race mix-
ture” that transformed “peoples of the earth into the present, highly variegated 
form.”81 Lind and Tead articulated the greatest fears of segregationists: levels of 
race intermixture that would make existing racial categories obsolete.
On the surface, miscegenation highlighted in US media may have appeared 
unrelated to the integration of the national blood supply, but the shared out-
comes of intimately mixed blood and genes struck a damning chord to segrega-
tionists. Together, bodily integration of blood and genes highlighted the issue 
that lay at the heart of race debates in the United States—mixture that muddied 
the ability to locate race within or even on the body. For while integrated blood 
transfusions made it harder to mark race difference from the inside, genetic 
race mixture complicated the ability to see race on the outside. Thus, whether 
invisible like the blood that pulsed life through one’s veins or visible in the phe-
notype of the ambiguously mixed-race person, anxieties about uncontainable 
racial crossings could hardly be placated. By the 1950s, distinctions between 
white/black and white/other, binary relationships on which white power had 
relied, became increasingly blurred.
It notes remembering the integration of the national blood supply in the 
broader context of civil rights to understand why a change that irreversibly 
disarmed the ability of blood to designate race did not play a more public role 
in arguments for racial equality. While blood segregation was central to civil 
rights protests during World War II, by the 1950s discussions about it receded 
into the background. It could be argued that once the ARC officially integrated 
the blood supply in 1950, many laid the issue to rest despite southern states that 
continued its labeling practices. It also makes sense that fighting to desegregate 
schools, lunch counters, and buses, geographic places where people could pub-
licly gather to protest and around which laws could be regulated, logically re-
mained central to the civil rights movement as it progressed into the 1950s and 
1960s. After all, physical spaces where segregating practices could be tracked 
with the naked eye served as a more effective battleground than the subcutane-
ous substance of blood.
Still, the deep symbolism of blood and the racist rulings it was used to sup-
port carried terrific weight for the civil rights movement. Since segregationist 
efforts were in part fueled by the anxiety that contact in public spaces might 
lead to intimate relationships whereby genetic and blood mixture would occur, 
integrated blood transfusions had the potential to discursively dismantle the 
entire premise of segregating policies at its core. Mixed blood suggested that 
the very distinctions on which racial segregation relied, black bodies and white 
bodies, were no longer easily identifiable as such. In the 1950s, blood became 
a less potent site of race, but this did not happen naturally. The concerted ef-
forts of blood programs like the ARC and the NBP, as well as UNESCO and 
the mainstream press, helped drive a wedge between race and blood. Although 
each had its own agenda, together their efforts defused the power of blood to 
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designate race, a shift that pushed blood out of the center and to the periphery 
of race-identifying practices.
After 1950, with millions of pints of transfused blood already anonymous-
ly mixed from within, blood could no longer be the scientific locus of race dif-
ference or, perhaps more important, the site for espousing the fiction of white 
racial purity. As the body increasingly failed to signal distinct differences be-
tween whiteness and blackness, those wanting to sustain white power needed 
to look elsewhere to find race. With blood and phenotype destabilized and the 
broader failure of biological science to support racist claims, race moved away 
from the body. Many have attributed the shift toward cultural racism beginning 
in the 1960s as backlash against the civil rights movement, but few include the 
integration of the national blood supply as a possible contributing factor.82 What 
the turn toward culture-of-poverty theories in the 1960s and neoconservatism 
in the 1970s demonstrates is the disturbing adaptability of racially discrimina-
tory practices.83 Even as skin color and blood became increasingly unreliable 
locations of race, structural discrimination continued unabated in the post–civil 
rights era as those vested in upholding white power moved the markers of race 
elsewhere, outside of the body. 
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